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The purpose of this thesis is to examine how intellectual property rights and patent protec-
tion affect access to essential medicine and innovation. The focal point of this thesis is the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which has been im-
plemented by all WTO members, thus covering most of international trade. This thesis 
mainly focuses on developing countries in need of essential medicine, as the potential re-
stricting effects are the most drastic in these countries. 
 
The public debate surrounding the TRIPS agreement has repeatedly brought up two con-
trasting notions. On one hand, patent protection is seen as restricting access to essential 
medicine, whereas on the other hand, it is seen as necessary to encourage research and 
development. Thus, this thesis focuses on a comparative analysis of these two contrasting 
notions in an effort to identify what could be done to ensure access to essential medicine 
without undermining future innovation. 
 
The study relies on a qualitative analysis of secondary literary sources, including publica-
tions by the WTO, pertinent NGOs and the pharmaceutical industry. Existing quantitative 
analyses were also used to examine the relationship between patent protection and inno-
vation. 
 
This study finds that patent protection and the TRIPS agreement restrict access to essen-
tial medicine. Patent protection in itself is also unlikely to lead to the build-up of innovative 
capacities in developing countries. Furthermore, patent protection is unlikely to encourage 
the development of products that cater to markets, such as developing countries, which 
are unable to pay the high prices required to recoup the costs of research and develop-
ment.  
 
The study concludes that the TRIPS agreement could be amended to facilitate easier ac-
cess to medicine in public health crises, while taking into account the commercial interests 
of the patent holder. Working within a TRIPS-system would also require increased public 
spending and charitable efforts to develop products that cater to developing countries. The 
effects of patent protection on innovation in the public sector is also identified as a topic of 
further studies. 
Keywords intellectual property rights, patents, TRIPS, essential medi-
cine, pharmaceutical products 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations between 1986 and 1994 saw the 
formation of two major factors to international trade, namely the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). The latter is an agreement signed by all WTO member states, which 
established the minimum level of intellectual property protection (IPR) to be imple-
mented in all member states. As intellectual property had become an important part of 
trade, which itself had become increasingly international, TRIPS was negotiated to es-
tablish common standards of IPR in order to provide order and predictability to interna-
tional trade. 
 
Following the entry into force of TRIPS, trade disputes and public debate ensued on 
the topic of access to medicine. While the major trade disputes were settled relatively 
quickly, the public debate has remained to this day. Developing countries have been hit 
hardest by disease, the region of Sub-Saharan Africa carrying arguably the heaviest 
burden of disease. Despite efforts being made to ensure access to medicine, it contin-
ues to be a major obstacle to treating epidemics of AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. 
 
1.1 Objective and Scope 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the effects of TRIPS and patent protection on 
access to medicine. It is important to firstly gain an understanding of how patent protec-
tion affects access to medicine, and then to identify what could be done to facilitate 
easier access in areas of need. The effects of TRIPS on access to medicine are dis-
cussed through two prominent trade disputes that followed the implementation of 
TRIPS. The cases of the Brazilian and South African healthcare reforms in the 1990’s, 
and the consequent trade disputes, have helped to identify outstanding issues in the 
access debate. These two disputes and the motivations of the parties involved bring up 
the dilemma of patent protection restricting access to medicine, while also acting as a 
means to encourage innovation. The two main questions this thesis aims to answer are 
(1) does TRIPS restrict access to medicine and (2) whether this is necessary to en-
courage research and development (R&D). Through a comparative analysis of these 
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two conflicting notions, this thesis aims to identify what could be done to ensure access 
to essential medicine without risking a drop in R&D efforts. 
 
While the necessity of IPR in general has been the subject of debate, this thesis will 
focus on the pharmaceutical industry and pharmaceutical products for two reasons. 
Firstly, the R&D process in pharmaceuticals differs radically from other industries. Sec-
ondly, pharmaceutical products, and especially essential medicine, differ radically from 
other goods, e.g. computers or smart phones, due to their paramount importance in 
public health. The countries of focus of this thesis could be rather loosely considered to 
be developing countries dealing with public health crises and a need for access to es-
sential medicines. While the most prominent proportion of such countries, and the larg-
est burden of disease, is located in Sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil is also included in this 
group of target countries for the purposes of this thesis due to their public health crises, 
healthcare reform, and prominent role in the access debate.  
 
1.2 Method and Limitations 
 
This relies on a qualitative analysis of secondary literary sources. Due to the nature of 
this paper being a commentary and participation in the debate regarding access to es-
sential medicine, all sides of the debate – the WTO, NGOs and the pharmaceutical 
industry – are used as sources for their respective sides on the debate. Further literary 
sources in the forms of relevant books and peer-reviewed journal articles are used to 
firstly fill gaps in information, and secondly to support the author’s own argumentation. 
 
It must be acknowledged that due to the nature of the topic, the participants of the de-
bate are likely to have their own agendas to push. Thus, whenever deemed necessary 
and proven possible, the facts and figures cited by the various organisations featured in 
this paper have been verified from as many sources as possible, in order to ensure the 
objectivity of this paper. 
 
This paper also cites quantitative analyses of the relationship between patent protec-
tion and innovation. While the studies are based on a large data set to ensure reliabil-
ity, it must be noted that these studies were done across all industries. Due to the dras-
tically different cost structure – mainly the importance of substantial up-front costs of 
new product development – of the pharmaceutical industry, the findings of the cited 
studies should be considered tentatively. More limited studies on the effects of patent 
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protection on R&D specifically within individual national pharmaceutical industries do 
exist, but the timeframe of these studies is relatively limited due to the fact that patent 
protection on pharmaceutical products has been a recent development in many coun-
tries. 
 
During the research process, it proved to be very difficult to gain insight into the effects 
of patent protection on publicly funded pharmaceutical R&D. The universities and re-
search laboratories operating on public funding are also applying for patents on their 
inventions, but it remains inconclusive to which degree their R&D efforts are guided by 
the financial gains associated with patents and licensing agreements. This relationship 
between patent protection and R&D in the public sector is identified as an area of fur-
ther research.  
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2 Background and Key Definitions 
 
2.1 The Access Problem 
 
Roughly 70 percent of the total people living with HIV reside in Africa, despite it repre-
senting only 15 percent of the global total population. Sub-Saharan Africa is most af-
fected by the epidemic with nearly all of the HIV-infected population of Africa (UN-
AIDS, 2013). The area is home to roughly 25 million HIV-infected people, and the rate 
of new infections has hovered around the 1.5 million mark in recent years. Estimated 
AIDS-related deaths in the area in 2014 totalled at 790 000, down from the annual 
average of 1.2 million between 2000 and 2012 (UNAIDS, 2015). While strides have 
been taken in forcing the amount of new infections to a decline, and matching the 
numbers of access to treatment with the new infections, the public health issues are 
far from solved. 
 
While HIV tends to receive the most publicity and have the highest shock value, it is 
not the only public health concern in the area. Tuberculosis is another serious risk to 
public health occurring mainly in low- and middle-income countries. In recent years, it 
has even surpassed AIDS as the infectious disease accounting for most deaths world-
wide. It is also a leading cause of death among HIV-positive people, accounting for 
roughly a third of HIV-related deaths. While over half of new infections occur in South-
East Asia and the Western Pacific, Africa has the most infections per capita (WHO, 
2016a).  
 
Malaria is another life-threatening disease mostly prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Young children and pregnant women are particularly susceptible to it. While it is both 
preventable and curable, it poses a significant health risk to a relatively focused region. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly the most affected, representing roughly 90 percent of the 
over 200 million cases and nearly 500,000 deaths reported globally in 2015 (WHO, 
2016b). 
 
Developing countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have been hit hardest by 
disease; out of the 30 countries classified as LDCs, 25 are located in Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca. Various socioeconomic factors present challenges to effective prevention and 
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treatment of disease in this region. It is home to substantial, oft-neglected rural popu-
lations that are often dealing with poor infrastructure and a lack of basic necessities. 
Essentials such as clean water and basic sanitation are often scarce, which is a major 
factor in the spreading of disease. Furthermore, the isolation and poor infrastructure 
present their own difficulties to accessing healthcare. And even the healthcare systems 
themselves are often dealing with their own issues, such as a lack of qualified person-
nel, limited resources and poor infrastructure. In addition, unstable political conditions 
and corruption present obstacles on yet another facet of society (CIA, n.d.). While the 
access problem obviously has several facets – the price of drugs being merely one of 
them – the commentary in the following sections will deal mostly with the contribution 
of IPR protection on the phenomenon known as the access problem. 
 
2.2 Pharmaceutical Products and Essential Medicine 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term pharmaceutical product refers to drugs that 
are used to prevent, diagnose, treat and cure disease. This definition includes both 
synthetic drugs such as Aspirin as well as biopharmaceutical products such as antibiot-
ics and vaccines. 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) publishes a biannual list of essential medicines. 
These are the drugs that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population, and 
they should ideally be available in adequate quality and quantities, correct dosage 
forms, and at prices that are affordable to the population. The list is not a global 
standard per se, as most countries publish their own national lists. However, it has 
become a common concept in promoting health equity (WHO, 2016d). The products on 
the list range from basic necessities such as painkillers, antibiotics and vaccines to 
more complex treatments for life threatening disease such as AIDS and multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis. As the list is updated biannually with the addition of new drugs 
considered essential, some of which are under patent protection and thus relatively 
expensive, this group of pharmaceuticals has become something of a focal point in the 
access debate. 
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2.3 The TRIPS Agreement 
 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, conducted within the framework 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), took place between 1986 and 
1994. The negotiations dragged on for nearly twice the originally intended schedule, 
and the topics discussed covered nearly all aspects of international trade. At comple-
tion in April 1994, the then 123 member states came to an agreement. As a result, the 
WTO was created, and it took over as the successor to GATT on January 1st, 1995. 
While GATT was replaced, it still serves as the foundations of the WTO (WTO, 2014a). 
 
The TRIPS Agreement was also negotiated during the Uruguay Round. Similar to the 
trade negotiations and the WTO, the negotiations on intellectual property rights were 
vast in scope and built upon already existing agreements, such as the Berne, Paris and 
Rome Conventions. Unlike GATT and WTO, TRIPS did not replace these conventions, 
but rather acknowledged and reiterated overlapping parts of them (WTO, 1994). Con-
sidering the constant and rapid technological development at the time, many industries 
had become increasingly dependent on innovation, research and testing. And as trade 
was becoming increasingly international, and intellectual property had gained im-
portance as a source of wealth – at least in developed, industrialised countries – the 
establishment of common rules was perceived important. The TRIPS Agreement was 
negotiated with the aim of narrowing gaps in how IPRs were protected in member 
states, in order to facilitate stability and predictability in trade. It aimed to do so by es-
tablishing common minimum standards of IPR protection for all member states (WTO, 
2014b). 
 
Member states were given a one-year transition period for implementing the TRIPS 
Agreement. In order to aid the less developed member states in their transition to 
TRIPS-compliance, two types of extensions were given. Developing countries and 
countries under-taking structural reforms were given a four-year extension, whereas 
the 20 member states classified as LDCs received a ten-year extension. In an effort to 
mitigate possible adverse effects of implementing the agreement – for example limited 
access to medicine during public health crises – the agreement provided two mecha-
nisms: compulsory licensing and parallel imports (WTO, 1994). 
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2.4 Patent Protection as Applied under TRIPS 
 
Under TRIPS, member states are obliged to grant patent protection to any invention – 
whether product or process – in all fields of technology. Patentable subject matter 
must firstly be new, meaning that it cannot be already considered public domain or be 
considered common technical knowledge in the field in question. Secondly, the inven-
tion must consider an inventive step, meaning that it cannot be deducted by using 
common technical knowledge. Lastly, the invention must be capable of industrial appli-
cation. Patents are to be available without discrimination as to the place of invention or 
whether it is imported or locally produced. The minimum patent duration is 20 years 
from the date of filing of the patent application. 
 
Patents on new products prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, 
and selling or importing for these purposes of the product, without the consent of the 
patent owner. Patents on new processes, on the other hand, prevent third parties from 
using, offering for sale, and selling or importing for these purposes of the product ob-
tained through the patented process, without the consent of the patent owner. Patent 
owners are free to transfer the patent or to conclude licensing agreements for third 
parties to the patent at their discretion. 
 
TRIPS Article 31 allows for compulsory licenses to be issued under certain conditions in 
case it is in line with the legislation of the member state. Compulsory licensing allows 
for the use of the patented subject matter by the government or third parties author-
ised by the government without the consent of the patent owner. The most fundamen-
tal requirement is that the proposed user of the license must have made efforts to ob-
tain a license under reasonable commercial terms, and that this has not been success-
ful within a reasonable amount of time. This requirement may be waived, however, in 
the case of a national emergency or in other circumstances of extreme urgency. In 
such cases, the patent owner must simply be notified as soon as possible that a com-
pulsory license will be or has been issued. Such compulsory licenses must be non-
exclusive and used mainly for the supply of the domestic market. In case a compulsory 
license is issued, the patent owner is to be paid adequate remuneration depending on 
the economic value of the compulsory license. 
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As this paper discusses TRIPS in the context of pharmaceutical products, it is worth 
noting that this provision would allow for governments to issue a compulsory license in 
order to drive down the price of a drug by introducing generic competition to the mar-
ket. The manufacturer of a generic drug would be able to manufacture and sell the 
product at a significantly lower cost and price, as they would avoid the high costs as-
sociated with research, development and clinical testing already incurred by the patent 
owner. 
 
Another flexibility provided by TRIPS is the use of parallel imports. Article 6 states that 
none of the provisions of the agreement may be used to address the issue of exhaus-
tion of IPR, unless it is in cases of non-discrimination. In other words, each member 
state has the discretion to decide the point at which IPRs become exhausted by them-
selves. After the IPRs have become exhausted, it is possible to engage in parallel im-
porting. 
 
This flexibility relies on the concept that the patent owner holds no rights over the pa-
tented product once it has been sold at their consent at a market. For example, if the 
patent owner or another party with the permission of the patent owner has sold a 
product in Country A, and it is then imported by the purchaser to be sold in Country B, 
it is known as a parallel import. In practice, this would make it possible to source the 
lowest global price in an effort to combat differential pricing. For example, if a drug is 
patented in both Country A and Country B, but sold at a lower price in Country A, it 
would be possible to purchase the drug in Country A and then import it to Country B to 
be sold at a price lower than before. 
 
TRIPS entered into force on 1 January 1995 with a one-year transition period, meaning 
that the national laws of member states had to meet all of the aforementioned mini-
mum requirements by 1 January 1996. Two types of extensions to the general transi-
tion period were given. Developing countries and countries undertaking structural re-
forms were given a four-year extension, requiring TRIPS-compliance by 1 January 
2000. The then 20 countries classified as LDCs were received a ten-year extension, 
requiring TRIPS compliance by 1 January 2006. An additional five-year extension was 
also given to developing countries for applying patent protection to areas of technology 
that did not have patent protection prior to TRIPS. Thus, if a developing country did 
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not grant patent protection to pharmaceutical products prior to the entry into force of 
TRIPS, they had until 1 January 2005 to apply patent protection.  
 
Despite the extensions given, each member state was required to begin to accept pa-
tent applications for new inventions beginning from 1 January 1995. In case a patent 
application was filed prior to a national patent law having been passed, the application 
would be examined after the relevant patent law was passed taking into account the 
prior art of the time of the initial patent application. In case of a successful application, 
patent protection would be applied to the remaining patent duration counted from the 
date of the initial application. Under TRIPS, patents would only apply to new inven-
tions, and any product patented elsewhere prior to 1 January 1995 would not be re-
quired to be granted patent protection. 
 
Brazil and South Africa – the two countries highlighted in this thesis – became TRIPS-
compliant with pharmaceutical patents in 1996 and 1997, respectively. India – another 
country noted for their extensive production of generic pharmaceuticals – made use of 
all the possible flexibilities and became TRIPS-compliant with pharmaceuticals on 1 
January 2005. 
 
2.5 Evolution of the Agreement 
 
2.5.1 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
 
The 4th WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. Lead-
ing up to the conference, the African member states had taken a unified stance and a 
cohesive agenda in pointing out their special needs in regard to access to medicine (‘t 
Hoen, 2002: 50). In response to this and the public debate that had followed the 
TRIPS Agreement, the WTO made an important declaration in Doha. The declaration 
recognised the gravity of the public health concerns in developing countries and LDCs, 
and acknowledged the importance of TRIPS in overcoming these issues. Thus, the 
WTO stressed that TRIPS could and should be implemented by the member states in a 
way that promoted public health and access to medicine for all (WTO, 2001). 
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The declaration also stressed several times that member states were allowed to act 
autonomously in setting their legislation. This could be seen as touching upon the po-
tential problem of developing countries and LDCs being pressured into setting patent 
laws that are more restrictive than required by TRIPS (WTO, 2001). The legal action of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association against South Africa, and the related trade 
sanctions imposed by the United States – which will be discussed in their own chapter 
in more detail – were a prime example of this. While the statement might have seemed 
somewhat superfluous, it could have also been seen as a first step towards building 
consensus. 
 
Most importantly, certain key technicalities of TRIPS were also clarified. In regard to 
parallel imports, the content of the agreement was simply reiterated – each member 
state was free to determine the point at which IPR became exhausted, and that such 
decisions could not be challenged on any other grounds than non-discrimination. As 
already mentioned in section 2.4, the concept of exhaustion is what enabled member 
states to engage in parallel imports. On the topic of compulsory licensing, it was stated 
that each member had the right to grant compulsory licenses, and – most importantly 
– each member was free to determine the grounds on which they were granted, and 
what constituted as a “national emergency” or “other circumstances of extreme urgen-
cy” (WTO, 2001). 
 
The then 29 member states that were classified as LDCs were also given a further ex-
tension on implementing the parts of TRIPS - related to patent protection and protec-
tion of undisclosed information – in the context of pharmaceutical products. This 
meant that the LDCs had until 1 January 2016 to consider at least parts of their future 
IPR legislation (WTO, 2001). 
 
One of the few major questions that remained unanswered after the declaration was 
related to TRIPS Article 31(f), which limited the use of compulsory licensing predomi-
nantly for the domestic market of the member states. This issue could prove to be par-
ticularly problematic for those member states with little to no manufacturing capacity, 
as well as those with the capacity and willingness to help other member states. How-
ever, the declaration did acknowledge the issue, and its potential to limiting some 
member states’ effective use of the flexibilities provided by TRIPS. It called for the 
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TRIPS Council to find a prompt solution to the issue, latest by the end of 2002 (WTO, 
2001). This part of the declaration became to be known as the Doha Assignment. 
 
2.5.2 The Doha Assignment 
 
The completion of the Doha Assignment was delayed by nearly a year, but finally, in 
September 2003, a decision was finally made on TRIPS Article 31(f) and the outstand-
ing issue of exporting under a compulsory license. One of the major reasons for the 
delay was the fear that a solution not specific enough could potentially lead to unfore-
seen effects – such as application in too wide a scope – in the domestic markets of 
developed member states (Barton, 2004: 149). Finally, the solution was limited to be 
used in good faith, and to only apply to pharmaceutical products in order to protect 
public health. It was also stressed that the risk of trade diversion – i.e. re-exportation 
of the products to markets other than the specific importer – should be mitigated 
(WTO, 2003). 
 
With this solution, any member state with insufficient manufacturing capacity could 
issue a compulsory license and import a generic version of a drug to address public 
health concerns within their borders. The terms for this process were quite straight-
forward. Initially, the importing member state is required to notify the TRIPS Council of 
its intent to use the system, provide sufficient proof of the lack of manufacturing ca-
pacity, and to specify the names and quantities of the drugs imported before issuing a 
compulsory license. The exporting country, in turn, is required to notify the TRIPS 
Council of its intent to export, produce only the exact amounts required, and to differ-
entiate the exported products from any other versions of the product they might 
manufacture (WTO, 2003). 
 
2.5.3 Amendment of the Agreement 
 
The TRIPS Agreement was amended to its current form in December 2005, with the 
addition of content similar to the aforementioned Doha Assignment. The solution to 
issues related to Article 31(f) was already presented in September 2003, and finally 
annexed to TRIPS as Article 31bis. The mechanism that enabled the export of products 
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manufactured under a compulsory license remained unchanged from the one present-
ed in 2003 (WTO, 2005). 
 
Article 31bis(3) also technically enables member states to act together in order to ben-
efit from economies of scale in manufacturing or importing pharmaceutical products 
manufactured under a compulsory license, and then exporting it to the other member 
states. This article applies to developing countries and LDCs under three specific condi-
tions. Firstly, the member states must all be members of the same regional trade 
agreement and share the same public health concern. Secondly, at least half of the 
members of the regional trade agreement must be LDCs. And thirdly, one single mem-
ber state must handle all of the administration, import and distribution on behalf of the 
participating members (WTO, 2005). 
 
While the system might be criticised for adding unnecessary administrative hurdles to 
the process, it must at least be acknowledged that it does provide relatively good cov-
erage of the African continent. All of Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of six 
states – Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan – are members of 
eligible regional trade agreements. It should further be noted that of the 25 LDCs on 
the African continent, only two – Mauritania and Djibouti – are not benefitting from the 
flexibilities of this mechanism. Thus, the countries dealing with the worst public health 
crises are at least included (WTO, 2016). 
 
2.6 TRIPS-Plus Provisions 
 
The TRIPS Agreement sets only a minimum standard of IPR protection for all member 
states. Any provisions that go beyond those of TRIPS are commonly referred to as 
TRIPS-plus provisions. Such provisions are frequently found in bilateral or regional free 
trade agreements, for example in roughly 60 agreements in which the United States 
has been a negotiating party (Cohen-Kohler, Forman & Lipkus, 2008: 241). Considering 
the vast amount of free trade agreements currently in place, there is bound to be a 
wide discrepancy in the types of TRIPS-plus provisions that have been negotiated. And 
considering the wide scope of TRIPS, such provisions are not always directly limiting 
the use of flexibilities built into TRIPS. 
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However, in some cases TRIPS-plus provisions have been very restrictive. The most 
common examples of highly restrictive TRIPS-plus provisions include patent durations 
beyond the 20-year minimum established in TRIPS Article 33, increased patent protec-
tion, and limits on the use of compulsory licenses and parallel imports. Two notable 
African examples are Kenya and Uganda, both of which have implemented laws that 
further restrict the use of compulsory licensing and parallel imports. In the case of 
Uganda, this is despite it being classified as one of the LDCs, and thus eligible for a 10-
year extension to the transition period to TRIPS. Another notable example of restrictive 
TRIPS-plus provisions is the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA). The program provides products originating from countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa with duty- and quota-free access to the U.S. market in exchange for, among 
other things, heightened IPR protection (Cohen-Kohler, Forman & Lipkus, 2008: 241-
242). 
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3 The Patent Dilemma: Restricting Access to Encourage R&D 
 
Throughout the debate surrounding TRIPS, two contrasting notions have been repeat-
edly brought up. On one hand, concerns over patent protection restricting access to 
essential medicine have been voiced, whereas on the other hand, the pharmaceutical 
industry has maintained that the exclusivity granted by patents enables them to recoup 
their R&D expenditure, and removing such exclusivity would lead to less pharmaceuti-
cal R&D. Both points are understandable. However, essential medicine is a very deli-
cate issue, and lack of access can be measured in loss of lives.  
 
Thus, this section begins with an overview of two prominent trade disputes that have 
shaped the debate on access to medicine. After establishing the context with these 
disputes, a comparative analysis between the notions of patents restricting access to 
essential medicine and the necessity of patent protection to encourage R&D will be 
made in an effort to arrive at a solution that would both facilitate easier access without 
sacrificing future R&D efforts. 
 
3.1 Prominent Trade Disputes Following the TRIPS Agreement 
 
Criticism, debate and even confusion ensued in the wake of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
Agreement was criticised for being a “one-size-fits-all” approach to IPR protection that 
simply extended the IPR laws of developed countries into developing countries (MSF, 
2011). Two prominent disputes took place around the turn of the millennium: a joint 
lawsuit by multinational pharmaceutical companies against the government of South 
Africa, and a trade dispute between the United States and Brazil. These two widely 
publicised events brought up important issues with the implementation of TRIPS that 
needed to be addressed (‘t Hoen, 2002: 30-33). 
 
In the mid-1990’s, the government of South Africa set to reform their healthcare sys-
tem. At the time, the country had a two-tiered healthcare system with approximately 
20 percent of the population covered by private healthcare, and the remaining 80 per-
cent relying on a highly dysfunctional public sector that suffered from poor administra-
tion and infrastructure, as well as corruption and misallocation of resources. At the 
same time, the country faced an unprecedented increase in HIV infections with the 
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overall adult prevalence rate nearing the 20 percent mark. As the government was 
working with a severely limited budget and could thus not afford the costly patented 
drugs, it sought to address the issue through the use of generic versions of off-patent 
drugs and a legal amendment that allowed for parallel imports of patented drugs 
(Fisher & Rigamonti, 2005: 2-4). 
 
In February 1998, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa (PMA) 
filed a suit against the government of South Africa in the High Court of South Africa. 
The PMA sought to challenge the constitutionality of the new legal amendment as well 
as its compliance with TRIPS. Already during the media battle that preceded the law-
suit, the PMA had been backed by both the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactur-
ers of America (PhRMA) – a trade group representing the U.S. pharmaceutical industry 
– and the United States government. The group of supporters was also joined by the 
European Commission, which took the stance that the legal amendment both violated 
TRIPS, and negatively affected the interests of the European pharmaceutical industry 
(Fisher & Rigamonti, 2005: 3-10). As the matter went to court and the government of 
South Africa maintained that their actions were both constitutional and TRIPS-
compliant, the United States began to withhold trade benefits and threaten with fur-
ther trade sanctions (‘t Hoen, 2002: 30-31). 
 
Despite taking sides with the PhRMA and PMA, the United States did not take the dis-
pute to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Over the course of 1999, the dispute 
gained a great deal of media coverage and consequent public pressure, which arguably 
persuaded the United States to reconsider their stance. The US Vice President Al Gore, 
who was also acting as the co-chairman of the United States-South Africa Binational 
Commission, proved to be an ample target for activists and protestors. He had been 
active in pressuring South Africa to give in, but ran the risk of having the negative pub-
licity harm his efforts for the Presidential campaign of 2000. In September 1999, the 
United States announced a shift in their foreign trade policy and withdrew their support 
from the PMA. The United States and South Africa reached an agreement with the US 
withdrawing their sanctions, and South Africa pledging to comply with TRIPS. Shortly 
thereafter, the PMA suspended their lawsuit, and dropped the case unconditionally in 
April 2001 (‘t Hoen, 2002: 31; Fisher & Rigamonti, 2005: 3-10). 
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Another prominent case at the time was the WTO trade dispute between the United 
States and Brazil in 2000 (WTO, 2010). Brazil had a successful AIDS program that took 
advantage of both their capability to manufacture generic drugs locally, as well as the 
flexibilities built into TRIPS. Local pharmaceutical companies were manufacturing a 
major share of the drugs needed, and the rest were obtained through negotiations 
with drug companies. Brazil was actively leveraging their status as a significant buyer 
and the threat of issuing compulsory licenses in their negotiations to reduce the price 
of drugs. Through the use of these two tactics, Brazil had managed to reduce the price 
of antiretroviral drugs by roughly 80 percent (Cohen-Kohler, Forman & Lipkus, 2008: 
247). 
 
The Brazilian intellectual property law required the holders of Brazilian patents to man-
ufacture the products in question within Brazil in order to retain patent protection. The 
patent holders had three years to comply with the requirement, after which the prod-
uct in question would become subject to compulsory licensing. And in case the patent 
holder was to simply keep importing the product, parallel imports of third parties would 
be allowed as well (‘t Hoen, 2002: 42).  
 
In May 2000, the United States filed a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body, claiming that U.S. patent holders were being discriminated and that their rights 
were being violated. At the core of the complaint was that the Brazilian violated TRIPS 
Articles 27(1) and 28(1) (WTO, 2010). Article 27(1) stated that a patent should be 
available for any invention in any field of technology, regardless of whether or not the 
product was produced locally or imported. Furthermore, Article 28(1) stated that the 
patent should exclude third parties from making, using, selling or importing the prod-
uct for the purpose of selling without the consent of the patent owner (WTO, 1994). 
Brazil, in turn, argued that their actions were consistent with Article 5(A)(4) of the Par-
is Convention, which is incorporated into TRIPS under Article 2(1) (‘t Hoen, 2002: 45). 
Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention allows for a compulsory license to be issued 
upon failure to work the patent within three years of the granting of the patent (WIPO, 
n.d.). Essentially, both governments had a valid point in the argument, but the United 
States’ action was met with fierce criticism. 
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Brazil had long taken an active role in the debate on access to medicine, and had fully 
embraced the flexibilities of TRIPS. On numerous occasions, Brazil had also offered 
their assistance to developing countries in increasing their manufacturing capacity 
through skills- and technology transfer. Their active participation in the access debate, 
as well as their status as a model of success, was at least part of the reason why the 
United States’ action was met with such criticism. It was feared that the dispute would 
negatively affect the Brazilian program, and that it would deter other developing coun-
tries from exercising their rights within TRIPS (‘t Hoen, 2002: 45). 
 
These two disputes are prominent and telling examples of numerous issues with the 
TRIPS Agreement. Some member states either lacked full awareness of the flexibilities 
provided by the agreement, or did not prioritise public health over IPR protection. 
These disputes also provided a plausible argument for how strict patent protection 
could affect public health through increasing barriers for access to essential medicine – 
whether through adding hurdles or simply deterring others from exercising their rights. 
Lastly, the two disputes also showed warning signs of how the use of political power 
and coercion was not out of question when it came to protecting influential industries. 
With this in mind, it is worth asking to which extent TRIPS affects access to medicine. 
 
3.2 Do Patents Restrict Access? 
 
The concern regarding the access gap in developing countries and LDCs has under-
pinned much of the public debate around TRIPS and its application to pharmaceutical 
products. The inherent premise with TRIPS is that limitations on the use of new inven-
tions are set in the forms of IPR protection and the exclusivity granted by patents. The 
possible negative effects of these limitations on public health are then, at least to a 
certain extent, mitigated by the flexibilities provided in the form of compulsory licensing 
and parallel imports.  
 
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of TRIPS has been that it is too wide in scope 
and does little to differentiate between industries or patentable inventions. TRIPS in-
deed does very little to differentiate between industries or patentable subject matter. 
Article 27(1) simply states that patents shall be made available for any inventions – 
either products or processes – in all fields of technology (WTO, 1994). While it must be 
acknowledged that the agreement does contain other provisions that enable flexibilities 
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when, for example, public health is at risk, it is still fair to question whether this is the 
right approach. 
  
If we consider the fact that a patent grants the patent owner exclusive rights to make 
and sell their invention at, for example, a price point that maximises their profit, the 
implications of such behaviour are drastically different depending on the type of product 
in question. Assuming that a profit maximising price point is out of reach for any num-
ber of consumers, the implications are drastically different for a pharmaceutical product 
when compared to, for example, a memory foam mattress. Not all pharmaceutical 
products are alike in this regard either. For example, a patent on the foam formulation 
of a drug against hair loss has arguably much less serious implications than a patent 
on what is considered to be essential medicine. In the case of essential medicine, the 
cost of exclusion can be measured in the loss of lives.  
 
Bearing this in mind, it would appear that there is merit in the notion that essential med-
icine should at least receive special consideration. Thus, it is worth considering to 
which extent TRIPS affects access to medicine. 
 
3.2.1 Restrictive Effects Attributable to TRIPS 
 
As was already mentioned in section 2.4, TRIPS establishes patent protection on any 
new invention in any field of technology – including pharmaceutical products – for a 
minimum duration of 20 years. It is worth noting that patents granted prior to January 
1st 1995 were not required to be recognised in the new national laws, meaning that 
any pharmaceutical product patented prior to that date was free to be manufactured 
and sold by third parties. The patents granted from January 1st 1995 onwards granted 
the patent owner the exclusive right to make, sell and import for sale the patented 
product. 
 
As such, patent protection and the exclusive rights it grants do have effects on drug 
prices that are generally seen as restricting access. Firstly, the holder of the exclusive 
rights has the discretion to set the price as they see fit. The estimated average cost of 
developing a drug is roughly 2.3 billion Euros if accounting for the cost of failures of 
other drugs (PhRMA, 2015: 2). Considering such a high up-front cost, it is often the 
case that the price is such that enables the patent owner to recoup the R&D costs as 
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well as to make a profit. And secondly, the exclusive rights of the patent owner limit 
the amount of generic competition on the market, which would have a tendency to 
lead to lower prices. As the manufacturers of generic drugs do not incur the high costs 
of R&D, they would be able to sell the drug at a much lower price. The case of the 
Brazilian AIDS program is perhaps one of the most notable examples of the effects of 
introducing generic competition to the market, having reduced the price of antiretrovi-
ral drugs by roughly 80 percent. The effects of drug prices on access to medicine are 
naturally the most drastic in lower income countries. In regard to the AIDS epidemic in 
developing countries, it has been estimated that the removal of patent protection on 
pharmaceutical products, and the consequent effect on drug prices, would increase 
access to HIV/AIDS therapy by at least 30 percent (Borrell & Watal, 2002: 5). 
 
TRIPS does however, offer flexibilities for cases of public health crises. Article 6 states 
that the exhaustion of IPR cannot be contested unless it is a question of non-
discrimination. This means that each member state is free to determine the point at 
which IPRs become exhausted. Consequently, it is possible that a product sold in an-
other country at a lower price may be bought there, and imported for sale in another 
country without the consent of the patent owner, thus facilitating access through a 
lower drug price.  It is up to each member state to determine whether such a practice 
is allowed, depending on their objectives. 
 
Another key flexibility provided by Article 31 is the use of compulsory licenses, as ex-
plained in section 2.4. This enables a member state to issue a license to manufacture a 
patented product without the consent of the patent owner under various circumstanc-
es. In case a voluntary license has not been obtained within reasonable time and under 
reasonable commercial terms, a non-exclusive compulsory license may be issued. Fur-
thermore, in cases of national emergencies, this requirement may be forgone, and a 
compulsory license may be awarded promptly. This flexibility aims to mitigate the re-
strictive effects of patents in cases of public health crises. 
 
The provisions enabling compulsory licensing were amended in 2005, providing further 
flexibility to LDCs with limited production capacity. As TRIPS Article 31 initially enabled 
the use of compulsory licensing mainly for domestic markets, the amended Article 
31bis took better into account the member states that could not make full use out of 
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Article 31. Under Article 31bis, developing countries and LDCs which are members of 
the same regional trade agreement – half of which must comprise of LDCs – and share 
the same public health concern, may take joint action in compulsory licensing and dis-
tributing the products manufactured under a compulsory license to the member states. 
When using this mechanism, one single member state must handle all administration 
and distribution on behalf of all member states. 
 
Patent protection does tend to lead to higher drug prices, which in turn may lead to 
decreased access in poorer countries and among poorer populations. However, it must 
be noted that TRIPS does at least technically offer two viable alternatives to addressing 
this access barrier. It must also be noted that most drugs currently classified as essen-
tial medicine have already lost their patent protection. However, an increasing number 
of drugs classified as essential medicine may pose problems in the near future (WHO, 
2015). 
 
3.2.2 Potential Further Restriction through TRIPS-Plus Provisions 
 
While TRIPS does offer flexibilities to help combat the negative effects of patent pro-
tection on pharmaceutical products, it has been argued that these have been relatively 
unclear, and that the amendment to the agreement in 2005 added even more hurdles 
to the flexibilities (‘t Hoen, 2002: 41). The varying interpretations and consequent legal 
battles would at least lend credence to this notion if considered earnestly. Further-
more, it is interesting to note that there were only 24 reported cases of compulsory 
licensing between January 1995 when TRIPS entered into force, and June 2011. The 
episodes took place in 17 member states, mostly in upper middle income countries. It 
is also worth noting that very few episodes took place in LDCs, and even fewer after 
the amendment of the agreement in 2005 (Beall & Kuhn, 2012). 
 
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons for this surprising lack of compulsory licens-
ing. One reason behind the lack of LDCs using the flexibilities could very well be the 
lack of resources and legal expertise in order to manoeuvre through the red tape. The 
study by Beall and Kuhn (2012) also notes that most LDCs had already implemented 
TRIPS-compliant patent laws well before their deadline by 2004. The fact that the LDCs 
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had acted much quicker than necessary in ensuring TRIPS-compliance brings to mind 
the possibility of external pressure from other member states. 
 
If there were concerns over the TRIPS agreement extending western standards of IPR 
protection to developing countries, perhaps the politics related to international trade 
and the use of TRIPS-Plus provisions should be the real reason for concern. The two 
notable disputes discussed earlier revolved around TRIPS, and the case of PMA vs. the 
South African government showed that the use of political power or coercion is not out 
of question. As already briefly mentioned, the United States government lent its sup-
port to an interest group representing the U.S. pharmaceutical industry by taking a 
methodical approach to pressuring the government of South Africa. The United States 
initially placed South Africa on their Special 301 Watch List, which is simply used to 
identify trade barriers in the form of lacking IPR. Later on, trade benefits for South 
African products under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program were 
withdrawn. And finally, United States’ development assistance to South Africa was 
made conditional upon the resolution of the dispute (Fisher & Rigamonti, 2005: 7-8). 
The European Commission took a more moderate stance with the Vice-President of the 
European Commission sending a letter to the Vice President of South Africa. The letter 
urged the South African government to reconsider their stance, and stressed that com-
pulsory licensing would negatively affect the interests of the European pharmaceutical 
industry (‘t Hoen, 2002: 31).  
 
The dispute also provided fascinating insight into the opinions of the parties involved. 
The United States Ambassador to South Africa stated that “my Government opposes 
the notion of parallel imports of patented products anywhere in the world” (Fisher & 
Rigamonti, 2005: 7). The letter sent by the Vice-President of the European Commission 
also hinted at the possible lobbying power of the European pharmaceutical industry. 
 
The concerns related to political pressure and TRIPS-plus provisions has several mov-
ing parts. As TRIPS only sets the minimum standards for IPR, nothing is stopping 
member states from applying measures stricter than required. As already briefly men-
tioned in section 2.6, the most concerning TRIPS-plus provisions related to access to 
medicine are mainly patent durations over the minimum 20 years, and provisions that 
might block or inhibit the use of compulsory licensing and parallel imports. Another 
22 
 
concern might be exclusivity of test data, which would mean that the producer of ge-
neric drugs would not be allowed to use the test data used for the initial patent appli-
cation. This could seriously slow down the introduction of generic drugs.  
 
It is a legitimate concern that for example LDCs might be pressured or persuaded into 
adopting TRIPS-plus provisions in exchange for trade benefits. However, should a 
member state wish to accept such terms, it should be up to them to decide whether 
the benefits are worth it. For example, a correlation has been shown between stricter 
IPR laws and foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions related to R&D and patent-
centric industries (UNCTAD, 2002: 22). Thus, assuming the country in question was 
not dealing with public health crises, adopting TRIPS-plus measures in an effort to at-
tract FDI would at least seem somewhat rational. However, it should be noted that 
there are other, albeit financially costlier, viable options to attract FDI as well. For ex-
ample, improving the local infrastructure, lowering corporate taxes and paying subsi-
dies could be seen as viable options. The problem in addressing this risk is that mem-
ber states are free to set their own patent legislation. It is absolutely true that states 
with high bargaining power might “misuse” IPR to drive their agenda, but so might the 
states trading away their rights to the flexibilities of TRIPS. 
 
While the possible TRIPS-Plus provisions that would further restrict access to essential 
medicine are not the fault of TRIPS per se, they are a legitimate concern going forward 
and should thus be noted. 
 
3.3 The Need for Patents to Encourage R&D 
 
Considering the concerns discussed in the previous sections, it would be logical to raise 
the question of whether patents are necessary. The WTO has understandably argued 
that TRIPS and IPR protection promote invention, innovation and research (WTO, 
2014b). A similar sentiment has been echoed by both pharmaceutical company repre-
sentatives and interest groups (‘t Hoen, 2002: 56; Fisher & Rigamonti, 2005: 5). The 
general argument is that the exclusive rights granted to the patent owner act as an 
incentive to conduct research, and provides an opportunity to recoup the R&D expendi-
ture. Consequently, the opposition of compulsory licensing has rested on the notion 
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that it removes the exclusive rights from the patent owner, and thus reduces the 
amount of future R&D, as it is not feasible. 
 
However, there is evidence suggesting the contrary. The study by Lerner (2009) 
measured the effects of patent policy changes on innovation, and found no positive 
effects. Another study by Qian (2007) had relatively similar results, albeit in more de-
tail, concluding that patent protection alone does not stimulate domestic innovation. 
The study suggested that the effect of patent protection on innovation is largely de-
pendent the levels of development, education and economic freedom, pointing out that 
mainly the developed countries showed a positive correlation. Thus, while IPR protec-
tion might promote innovation in principle, in reality it is determined by much more 
than mere patent protection, and simply increasing the level of IPR protection will be 
unlikely to lead to positive results in less developed countries. 
 
Assessing trends in industry life cycles would also suggest a lack of correlation between 
patents and innovation; regardless of the initial level of patent protection, it mostly 
plays a key role only after the innovative activity has peaked. The concept of industry 
life cycle as presented by Porter (1980: 156-188) has been around for decades, and it 
is still widely regarded as the cornerstone of life cycle analyses. 
 
Typically, the industry is relatively fragmented in the early stages, meaning that there 
are several firms each with relatively little control of the direction of the industry. As 
the market is relatively undeveloped, there tends to be a high amount of product dif-
ferentiation, as each new entrant is trying to understand and answer customer needs, 
and to get their product on the market. The competition in the earliest stages is fo-
cused mostly on gaining first-mover advantages. As the industry matures, it tends to 
consolidate through mergers, acquisitions and exits of firms, and consequently the 
influence of individual firms is increased. And as the market becomes more developed, 
the differentiation of products will reduce over time, and the products will be mass 
produced. At some point of the life cycle, growth will inevitably level, and the competi-
tion will turn to focus more on market share between the existing firms. At this stage, 
the nature of competition will also change, as there will be less innovation in the indus-
try. It could be argued that at this stage, the competitive means change from offensive 
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ones – e.g. innovation and differentiation – to more defensive ones, such as the use of 
IPR to inhibit competitors and new entrants.  
 
The recent boom of the smart phone and tablet industry would be an appropriate ex-
ample of this, down to the emergence of the heavy use of patent litigation as a meas-
ure to inhibit competitors. The widely publicised, so-called smart phone patent wars, 
arguably truly escalated well after the initial burst of innovation. Various national 
pharmaceutical industries have followed a similar life cycle, beginning with a spur of 
innovation in the absence of patent protection, and only having it introduced after the 
industry had matured. For example, product patents for pharmaceuticals were intro-
duced in Germany in 1967, Switzerland in 1977, and France and Italy in 1978 (Condon 
& Sinha, 2008: 171). The study by Qian (2007: 450) also postulates that a phenome-
non similar to the life cycle hypothesis presented earlier is taking place at a national 
level. The study notes that countries tend to oppose patent laws when they are tech-
nology importers, and only begin to show an interest in stronger IPR when they have 
become technology exporters. 
 
Another argument against patents was already hinted in the example of them being 
used as a competitive measure to inhibit competitors and new entrants. That is that 
they have the potential to hinder innovation and slow down the diffusion of infor-
mation. The smart phone patent wars have provided an excellent example of what 
could be considered a negative externality: patent trolling. In 2011, Google acquired 
Motorola Mobility and their portfolio of 17,000 patents for US$12.5 billion. The main 
motivation for the purchase has been widely considered to be a patents arms race with 
other smart phone manufacturers, as the patents provide an opportunity to sue, coun-
ter-sue and “tax” competitors (WSJ, 2011). This kind of activity has two potential neg-
ative effects: firstly, it may hinder the innovation of others, and secondly, it may lead 
to higher consumer prices due to licensing fees having to be paid by the competitors 
infringing the patents. 
 
If patent protection appears to have little influence on innovation, it would then be 
reasonable to consider what would happen to the development of essential medicine in 
its absence. In regard to pharmaceutical products, the chemical compounds used are 
most often already known, but the efficacy is the most crucial aspect of the product. 
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Most of the R&D expenditure is spent on establishing the efficacy, and actually produc-
ing the product is relatively inexpensive. Furthermore, the lengthy pre-market trials are 
argued to last an average of 10 years, meaning that once the product is on the mar-
ket, there is only half of the patent duration left to enjoy the exclusive rights granted 
by the patent (PhRMA, 2015: 37). 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is unique in this regard that the R&D costs are extremely 
high, and that the lengthy trials eat away half of the patent duration prior to the prod-
uct entering the market. This sentiment was echoed in a statement by a representative 
of Bristol-Myers Squibb, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, in the statement that: "Pa-
tents are the lifeblood of our industry. Compulsory licensing and parallel imports ex-
propriate our patent rights,” further adding that the only beneficiary of these activities 
is the generic drug industry (Fisher & Rigamonti, 2005: 5). The International Federa-
tion of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA) has also shared this sen-
timent, stating that compulsory licensing is a threat to public health by denying future 
benefits of the R&D capabilities of the research-based pharmaceutical industry (‘t 
Hoen, 2002: 56). 
 
Considering the key role of pharmaceutical products in public health, and the high cost 
of exclusion associated with patent protection on essential medicine, this raises the 
question of whether the development of essential medicine should rest in the hands of 
commercial pharmaceutical companies to begin with. And considering that these com-
panies are also responsible to their shareholders, it is safe to assume that their motiva-
tion is not necessarily to promote public health, but rather to be profitable and increase 
shareholder wealth. This is especially problematic in the case of developing countries 
and their need for affordable essential medicine. It might simply not be feasible to in-
cur the high costs of developing a drug that is tailored for markets that are not able to 
pay prices that would allow the manufacturer to recoup their R&D expenditure. If the 
decisions on which drugs to develop are made on the basis of profitability, it might 
very well be that developing a drug to combat, for example, erectile dysfunction or hair 
loss is a much more lucrative project than a drug that is not needed in developed 
countries. 
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This notion of certain types of drugs being more profitable, and thus more lucrative 
projects for R&D investment is also shown in the types of drugs being developed by 
commercial pharmaceutical companies. Approximately one percent of new chemical 
entities marketed between 1975 and 1999 were for tropical diseases and tuberculosis. 
Furthermore, only 0.2 percent of the global R&D expenditure went to pneumonia, diar-
rhoeal diseases and tuberculosis despite them representing 18 percent of the global 
disease burden at the end of the 1990’s. And lastly, in the early 2000’s it was reported 
that 98 percent of the revenue for HIV/AIDS-related medicine came from OECD coun-
tries. The subtype of the virus most common in this area is not the one most common 
globally, and does not represent the largest burden of disease (Condon & Sinha, 2008: 
172-174). The WHO calls this the “10/90 gap”, meaning that only 10 percent of the 
global spending on research is devoted to diseases that represent 90 percent of the 
global disease burden (WHO, 2016c). In this light, and considering the comments of 
the representatives of the commercial pharmaceutical industry, the removal of patent 
protection for essential medicine would presumably only lead to a slight drop in R&D 
expenditure for essential medicine. 
 
It might then be reasonable to raise the question of who exactly is funding pharmaceu-
tical R&D. It has proven relatively difficult to obtain exact figures on how the spending 
on pharmaceutical R&D is divided between the public and private sectors. Further 
complications might arise due to accounting, as in some countries the state might for 
example provide tax credits on R&D, essentially meaning that they incur part of the 
cost indirectly. However, most statistics that could be found suggest that public spend-
ing on pharmaceutical R&D represents roughly between 40 and 60 percent of the total 
(PhRMA, n.d.; WHO, 2004: 13; Boldrin & Levine, 2008: 256-257). 
 
Scientific institutes such as universities and hospitals as well as specific research insti-
tutes tend to represent a major proportion of public pharmaceutical research. Within 
the last 30 years, especially universities have become a valuable source of drug dis-
covery. Due to the tendency of such institutes to promote the advancement of science, 
it would be reasonable to assume that their inclination is, at least to a certain extent, 
geared more towards public health. The areas of focus for the Academic Drug Discov-
ery Consortium – a major network of drug discovery centres including several universi-
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ties – would support this notion, as their largest areas of focus include oncology, infec-
tious diseases and immunology (ADDC, 2012). 
 
As regards the relationship between patent protection and pharmaceutical research in 
scientific institutes, there is much less data available than in the case of commercial 
pharmaceutical companies. However, it must be noted that within the last 30 years, 
universities have become increasingly involved in the pharmaceutical industry through 
patent ownership and licensing agreements with commercial pharmaceutical compa-
nies. It is, however, difficult to establish to which extent their research is focused on 
making patentable and licensable discoveries. Considering that commercial pharmaceu-
tical companies are the most vocal proponents of patent protection and the fact that 
the funding structure is drastically different in the public sector, it would make sense 
that relationship between patent protection and R&D efforts would differ as well. The 
fact that extremely few of the patents held by universities are financially significant 
would lend further credence to this notion (Edwards, Murray & Yu, 2003: 618). 
 
3.4 Suggestions 
 
One possible, perhaps radical, way to address the access problem that should be ex-
plored is the removal of patent protection for essential medicine. This would provide 
immediate relief to the access problem for the drugs that already exist through the 
removal of any IPR barriers to access. Such a measure has been, for example, postu-
lated to increase access to HIV/AIDS therapy by at least 30 percent (Borrell & Watal, 
2002: 5). Furthermore, it would not likely lead to a significant drop in R&D for essential 
medicine, as it tends to receive very little attention from commercial pharmaceutical 
companies to begin with. However, as the R&D would likely mostly rely on public fund-
ing, significant research should be done on the effects of patent protection on publicly 
funded R&D before this could be considered as a viable option. 
 
The removal of patent protection, while perhaps a radical notion, would not be an en-
tirely new concept. Trade barriers have been removed in the past to make way for free 
trade, so a similar treatment to patent protection should not be an alien concept. Fur-
thermore, this transition could be done through gradual shortening of patent duration, 
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for example. Until the feasibility of the aforementioned notion is thoroughly examined, 
we are left to rely on the commercial sector and TRIPS system to a certain extent.  
 
TRIPS in itself does present barriers to access to medicine simply by establishing pa-
tent protection and granting exclusive rights to patent holders. The lack of generic 
substitutes has been linked with higher drug prices, and the minimum patent duration 
of 20 years significantly delays the introduction of generic competition that would low-
er the prices. While the agreement does provide flexibilities to aid member states deal-
ing with public health crises, the mechanisms appear to be relatively complicated, and 
the use of such flexibilities has been few and far between. Exporting to LDCs under a 
compulsory license would be much more straight-forward without the requirement of 
both countries being within the same FTA, of which at least half of the members are 
LDCs. For example, allowing for exports of necessary quantities of drugs to a LDC with-
in the same continent would ease access while protecting the commercial interests of 
the patent holder to a reasonable extent. 
 
While certain governments and the pharmaceutical industry have not received the 
most favourable presentation in this paper, it must be pointed out that they do have 
initiatives in place to address the access problem. For example, Novartis has a non-
profit partnership in place with the Singapore Economic Development Board, in order 
to provide a cure for dengue, malaria and tuberculosis (Novartis, 2014). Such charita-
ble initiatives are many, albeit fragmented, which could be seen as leading to a limited 
impact. 
 
There are also other initiatives much larger in scale, such as the United States Presi-
dent’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) and the United Nations’ UNAIDS. While 
these initiatives have come under criticism for lack of focus and coordination, both the 
United States and United Nations have ties to various other programs. Perhaps one of 
the most comprehensive and focused programs is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tu-
berculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund). As the name implies, the program focuses 
on a wider range of diseases and works to both prevent and treat the diseases (The 
Global Fund, 2014). Considering the approach, scope and magnitude of the program, 
and seeing that education and prevention are also crucial areas in preventing AIDS, 
this could be considered to have high potential. 
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The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) is another promising program. The MPP is financed 
by UNITAID, which in turn comprises of 28 member states and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, and acts as a mediator between the patent holders and generic manufac-
turers. The aim of the program is to negotiate voluntary licenses for essential medi-
cine, which are in turn sublicensed to manufacturers of generic drugs (MPP, n.d.). 
Such a mechanism could be a viable option in expediting the market entry of generic 
versions of patented drugs, consequently lowering the prices in general. While the 
mechanism is based on voluntary licensing of existing drugs at the moment, it could 
also work as an incentive to develop drugs that cater to a market that would otherwise 
seem unprofitable.  
 
It would seem feasible to coordinate such efforts, eliminating overlapping agendas, 
and focusing increased efforts on the programs that show the most promise. While 
certainly a monumental task, an organization such as the WHO could be used to con-
solidate the efforts of the member states. An approach such as this would arguably be 
a band aid solution, as it essentially manipulates the system – i.e. TRIPS – to work 
towards promoting public health, but in the absence of fundamental adjustments to it, 
it might be the only way to work towards a solution both in the short and long term. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
Essential medicine deserves special recognition in terms of IPR. It plays a central role 
in the access problem and public health in general. Furthermore, the social costs of 
exclusion in terms of welfare losses are unique and most severe for this group of prod-
ucts. The occasionally heated public debate surrounding the access problem further 
validates this point. 
 
The TRIPS agreement has, to a certain extent, created barriers to access in the short 
term, and is unlikely to substantially promote neither innovation in essential medicine 
nor the development of innovative capacities in developing countries and LDCs in the 
long term. In the short term, and in regard to access to essential medicine, TRIPS has 
added barriers simply by subjecting essential medicine to patent protection, which in 
turn has been linked with decreased competition and higher drug prices. While the 
agreement has provided flexibilities in the form of compulsory licensing and parallel 
imports, these mechanisms have complicated the process of accessing affordable es-
sential medicine and could be simplified to improve access while maintaining the legit-
imate interests of the patent owner. In the long run, there are likely to be very few 
positive effects on the development of innovative capacities in developing countries 
attributable to TRIPS. While it is understandable that, at least in principle, patent pro-
tection and the exclusive rights it grants provide an incentive for inventors, it has been 
shown that the development of innovative capacities is much more dependent on the 
levels of economic development, education and economic freedom than the level of 
patent protection. Furthermore, by imposing limitations on generic drug manufactur-
ing, it is arguable that TRIPS will hinder the diffusion of information and build-up of 
knowledge and innovative capacities in countries such as India and Brazil, which are 
known as major producers of generic drugs.  
 
TRIPS is also unlikely to solve the fundamental problem underpinning the access prob-
lem. Even if the agreement did promote innovation, it would be extremely unlikely to 
promote innovation from commercial pharmaceutical companies related to curing dis-
eases that are not profitable. Thus, we should not rely on commercial ways to address 
the access problem, but rather turn towards the public sector. Charitable efforts such 
as patent pooling might be one possible band aid solution to making R&D on neglected 
31 
 
diseases more worthwhile for the commercial pharmaceutical companies. Under this 
system, the mediators would make licensing agreements with patent owners, and es-
sentially pay on behalf of those who cannot afford essential medicine.  
 
Further studies should be done on the effects of patent protection on R&D in the public 
sector in order to assess whether removing patent protection from essential medicine 
would be feasible. Removing such protection would ease access in the short term, but 
the question that remains is whether such a measure would entail a drop in public sec-
tor R&D towards essential medicine in the long term. Finally, even if this measure were 
to be pursued, the R&D efforts towards neglected diseases should be scaled up 
through public funding, and coordinated by a body with enough legal power, such as 
the WHO.  
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Excerpts from the TRIPS Agreement 
 
PART I 
 
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES 
 
Article 2 
 
Intellectual Property Conventions 
 
1. In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 
through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967). 
 
Article 6 
 
Exhaustion 
 
 For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Ar-
ticles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intel-
lectual property rights. 
 
 
PART II 
 
STANDARDS CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY, SCOPE 
AND USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
Article 27 
 
Patentable Subject Matter 
 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an in-
ventive step and are capable of industrial application.5  Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, para-
graph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights en-
joyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether prod-
ucts are imported or locally produced. 
 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of 
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provid-
ed that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
 
          5 For the purposes of this Article, the term “inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” may be 
deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms “non-obvious” and “useful” respectively. 
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Article 28 
 
Rights Conferred 
 
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
 
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having 
the owner’s consent from the acts of:  making, using, offering for sale, selling, or im-
porting6 for these purposes that product; 
  
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having 
the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of:  using, of-
fering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained 
directly by that process. 
 
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to 
conclude licensing contracts. 
 
          6 This right, like all other rights conferred under this Agreement in respect to the use, sale, importation or 
other distribution of goods, is subject to the provisions of Article 6. 
 
Article 29 
 
Conditions on Patent Applicants 
 
1. Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art and 
may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the inven-
tor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the priority date of the application. 
 
Article 30 
 
Exceptions to Rights Conferred 
 
 Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, pro-
vided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legit-
imate interests of third parties. 
 
Article 31 
 
Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder 
 
 Where the law of a Member allows for other use7 of the subject matter of a patent without the 
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the 
government, the following provisions shall be respected: 
 
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made ef-
forts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms 
and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable pe-
riod of time.  This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use.  In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of ex-
treme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably 
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practicable.  In the case of public non-commercial use, where the government or con-
tractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know 
that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be 
informed promptly; 
 
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
 
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market 
of the Member authorizing such use; 
 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each 
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization; 
 
          7 “Other use” refers to use other than that allowed under Article 30 
 
Article 33 
 
Term of Protection 
 
 The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty 
years counted from the filing date.8 
 
          8 It is understood that those Members which do not have a system of original grant may provide that the 
term of protection shall be computed from the filing date in the system of original grant. 
 
PART VI 
 
TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Article 66 
 
Least-Developed Country Members 
 
1. In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country Members, their eco-
nomic, financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable techno-
logical base, such Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than 
Articles 3, 4 and 5, for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under paragraph 1 
of Article 65.  The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a least developed country 
Member, accord extensions of this period. 
  
 
 
 
